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Abstract 
Purpose of the study: This paper aims to examine the effects of the monitoring mechanism and bonding mechanism of 
corporate governance on the performance of the bank. The monitoring mechanism is divided into an external 
mechanism, represented by concentrated ownership, and the internal mechanism is represented by the proportion of 
independent board. Bonding mechanism is measured issuance of bonds as long-term debt financing.  
Methodology: This study is predictive and exploratory, so the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling using 
a WarpPLS60 application. Researchers use data from 24 banks that constantly has the value of bonds circulated, which 
from 2011 to 2018. There are consists of 4 state-owned commercial banks, 13 private banks, and 7 regional government-
owned banks.  
Main Findings: The researcher found that external monitoring mechanisms as measured by ownership concentration, 
positively and significantly influence the performance at government-owned banks. Internal monitoring mechanism, as 
measured by the percentage of the number of independent commissioners, positively and significantly affects the 
performance at all the banks. The bonding mechanism as measured by issuing bonds negatively and significantly affects 
the performance of all the banks.  
Applications of this study: The integrative multi-theory model proposed by the authors in this study is a unique 
contribution to the intermediary financial literature. Banks seeking to maximize their performance must be balanced with 
the interests of shareholders and their stakeholders.  
Novelty/Originality of this study: The study examined the differences in behaviour and the role of monitoring and 
bonding mechanisms of corporate governance in state-owned banks and private. The results of this study contribute to 
the theory of entrenchment and financial intermediation.  
Keywords: Bank Performance, Bond Funding, Bonding Mechanism, Good Corporate Governance, Monitoring 
Mechanism, Path Analysis.  
INTRODUCTION  
Bank ownership in developing countries of Asia including Indonesia and Continental Europe is dominated by 
concentrated ownership structure. We follow related literature in using the concentration of ownership (e.g. percentage 
of shareholding of the largest shareholder) (Haque & Shahid, 2016) the majority share ownership is more than 5 percent 
of the total outstanding shares (Grassaa & Miniaoui, 2018). Anglo-Saxon countries such as Great Britain and the United 
States of America tend to have dispersed ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2000). This study explored the impact of 
different categories of ownership concentration. Ownership concentration has no impact on firm performance when 
measured by ROA (Desoky & Mousa, 2013). In the short term, ownership change is associated with lower ROA 
(Lindemanis et al., 2019).      
In Indonesia, the commissioners adhere to the Two Tiers' continental European legal system. The independent board of 
commissioners is one of the mechanisms of internal supervision as a supervisor who controls managers so that they do 
not act opportunistic (Fama & French, 1998). By increasing the proportion of independent boards of commissioners, 
they could be monitoring of management opportunistic behavior such as manipulating financial statements and fraud 
(Hermawan, 2011).  
The bank acts as an intermediary in meeting long-term funding by issuing primary security (in the form of shares, bonds, 
securities, etc.). Issuance of bond aims to strengthen the bank financing structure and credit expansion of the firm in the 
context of business development. Related to the firm’s financing needs, the corporate bonds market is made as 
alternative bank financing for long-term financing (Mukherjee, 2012). The phenomenon of bond issuances in the 
banking sector in Indonesia is influenced by the improving market perception of risk in the industry as well as the 
increasing need for capital for financial institutions. Funding growth from bond issuance and Third Party Funds in 
Indonesia has experienced a decline. The phenomenon of bond funding growth is higher than that of Third Party Funds, 
which 35.53% in 2011 and experienced fluctuations up and down to reach 16.16% in 2018. The decline in funding 
growth from Third Party Funds has declined from 19.08% in 2011 to reach 6.89% in 2018. Higher bond costs and lower 
credit ratings are generally associated with increased income (Ghouma, 2017).          
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The purpose of this research is to enrich the understanding of the monitoring mechanism and the limitation of the 
opportunistic behavior of managers to mitigate agency problems. The study will test the effect of an external monitoring 
mechanism measured with the percentage of concentrated ownership. The researcher found that external monitoring 
mechanisms as measured by ownership concentration, positively and significantly influence the performance at 
government-owned banks. Internal monitoring mechanism, as measured by the percentage of the number of independent 
commissioners, positively and significantly affects the performance at all the banks. The bonding mechanism as 
measured by issuing bonds negatively and significantly affects the performance of all the banks.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Monitoring mechanism 
Corporate governance mechanism is depicted as a firm simple balance sheet model (Ross et al., 2005). The left side is 
depicted as an internal governance element. Management as agents of shareholders decides which assets will be invested 
and how to fund the investment. The right side is depicted as external governance elements as a result of the firm’s need 
to gain capital. Empirical research proved that internal and external monitoring mechanism of a firm has a direct 
relationship with the financial power of a firm (Aguilar, 2016; Outa & Waweru, 2016). Monitoring refers to the effort of 
the firm’s owner to mitigate the manager’s opportunistic behavior (Mohamad Nur Utomo et al., 2018). Gillan (2006) 
divided the mechanism of corporate governance into two, which is the internal and external monitoring mechanism. The 
internal mechanism comes from the board of commissionaires, internal control, and internal audit function. The external 
mechanism comes from the stock market, firm’s control market, labor market, state status, court decision, and investor 
activity.  
Concentrated ownership as external monitoring 
Ownership concentration (OC) is most shares are owned by a small number of individuals or groups so that these 
shareholders have a relatively dominant number of shares compared to others (Dallas, 2004). The application of the 
supervisory mechanism is carried out by increasing the number of shareholdings. External governance mechanisms are 
proxied as ownership concentration (OC), influencing company performance (Gaur et al., 2015; Ozili & Uadiale, 2017). 
Different levels of ownership concentration in a company affect the implementation of governance (Yasser & Al 
Mamun, 2015). The structure of share ownership reflects the distribution of power and influence of shareholders on the 
company's operational activities. The greater the amount of share ownership, the greater its role in controlling and 
determining the policy direction to achieve company goals (Pergola & Verreault, 2009). Large shareholders can monitor 
and control managerial activities (Desoky & Mousa, 2013). The concentration of ownership increases control in 
companies, this is related to increased monitoring of management and reducing the increase in scattered ownership 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The concentration of ownership increases control in companies, this is related to increase 
monitoring of management and reducing the increase in dispersion of the cost of waiver by the manager. Other 
mechanisms can result in different ownership effects on concentration on performance. With great power, dominant 
shareholders can take over the welfare of small shareholders (Stulz, 1988). Entrenchment Theory states that a higher 
concentration of ownership will increase the power of control of company owners, thereby minimizing the power of 
abuse of managerial control for personal gain and taking over minority stakeholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Leech & 
Leahy, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Agency problems can potentially harm other parties who do not have control 
rights (minority shareholders) and can cause performance decreases (Sakawa & Watanabel, 2017).   
Hypothesis 1a: Concentrated ownership has a negative effect on bank performance 
Board of Independent Commissionaire as internal monitoring 
A modern business organization can maximize firm performance by creating a separated management structure. There 
are two management structure, Board of Directors, that manage the firm through strategic managerial decision; and 
Board of Commissionaire, which consists of Ordinary Commissionaire and Independent Commissionaire that monitor 
the direction and path of the firm according to the principles of corporate governance (Sukmono, 2015; M.N. Utomo et 
al., 2018). Independent commissioners are non-affiliated entities, which are precisely entities without business affiliation 
and kinship relations with shareholders, with members of the Board of Directors and the Board of Commissioners, and 
with other company stakeholders (KNKG 2006). Board of Independent Commissionaire (BIC) is one of the elements of 
an internal monitoring mechanism (Dharmastuti & Wahyudi, 2013; Hermawan, 2011). The investigation results in the 
relationship between agency theory with the monitoring committee, ownership structure with financial performance are 
positive, either individually or as interaction (Coles et al., 2001). The forming of a board of independent 
commissionaires is one of the implementations of corporate governance principles which are independence. Some 
empirical research about the influence of the board of independent commissionaire of the firm and firm performance 
(Leung et al., 2014; Lin, 2011; Rashid, 2018; Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018).   
Hypothesis 1b: Board of Independent Commissionaire positively influence the bank performance 
Bonding mechanism by issuing bonds 
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External financing policy is needed by the firm to fund business opportunities as well as their investments, based on 
pecking order theory Myers (1984) as a result of a trade-off between two choices of using traditional funding, debt or 
equity. According to most of the results of financial literature, debt financing has more advantages compared to equity. 
The firm will receive many benefits from a tax deduction when it chooses to issue debt because the firm tax is calculated 
after the interest being paid to debt holders (Ross et al., 2008). Debt will have a role in monitoring the firm because firm 
with high leverage tends to give a positive signal to the market, thus it potentially decrease asymmetrical information 
between companies and investors which leads to the lower future finance cost (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Corporate 
Governance is influenced by the amount of long-term debt because debt holders have the motivation to ensure that 
managers do not follow their selfish behavior (Jensen, 1986).  
Bond is one of the bullet loans, the loan payment using a balloon payment mechanism. A balloon payment is a loan with 
a long-term amortization schedule to pay interest (the coupon) per year, while the principal debt can be paid later at the 
time of maturity of the loan or according to the agreement. This payment arrangement is one of the advantages for banks 
that expect large cash flows for their operational needs as an intermediary. Thus the bank can set up funds before the 
maturity date. This is what distinguishes bond funding from ordinary debt funding, where the payment of installment 
financing with ordinary debt, including principal and interest, has been agreed upon. Amihud et al. (1999) Were 
introduced a new governance structure to meet funding through publicly issued company bonds. Companies will have 
more flexibility in building the desired structure using bond financing (Kwan & Carleton, 2010). Issuance of bonds gives 
companies the freedom to take corporate action without binding the rules that limit the lenders (Lin et al., 2013). There is 
a tendency to change the system of dependence on funding from bank-based to market-based (Astrauskaite & 
Paškevicius, 2014). Issuing bonds have a maturity that remains different from equity financing that has unlimited 
maturity (Norden et al., 2016). 
Hypothesis 2: Bond issuance has a positive effect on bank performance 
METHODOLOGY  
Data sample 
The source of data is a secondary data panel, which is a combination of time series and cross-section. The period of 
research starts from 2011 to 2018. Sampling criteria are explained as follows: (1) Banks that carry out corporate actions 
to issue bonds, and have a record of outstanding bonds; (2) Banks that have a majority shareholding of more than 5 
percent, and consisting of financial statements and annual report. The data collection technique is the documentation of 
the Indonesian Central Securities Depository recorded since the beginning of 2000 to June 2018. 40 banks have issued 
bonds in Indonesia from a population of 134 banks listed in the Financial Services Authority and only 24 banks that 
constantly has the value of bonds circulated, which from 2011 to 2018. Consists of 4 state-owned commercial banks, 13 
private banks, and 7 regional government-owned banks. Therefore, the total of the observed panel data is 192. 
Variable Measurement 
Independent Variable  
Concentrated ownership (OC) is the majority shareholder with characteristics as the controlling shareholder of the 
company (in this case the bank) who owns at least 5% of the total shares outstanding (Brockman & Olsen, 2013; Core et 
al., 1999; Cremers et al., 2007; Desoky & Mousa, 2013; Farooq, 2015). In Indonesia, it is regulated in the Financial 
Services Authority Regulation Number 56/POJK.03/2016 concerning bank ownership. All ownership samples 
concentrated in this study are a small number of individuals or groups that have a minimum or equal share of 5% in the 
Banking Sector in Indonesia. 
According to the Financial Services Authority Circular Letter Number 13/ SEOJK.03/2017 Independent Commissioners 
are members of the Board of Commissioners. Then the independent board of commissioners (BIC) is a percentage of the 
total number of the board of commissioners (Cavaco et al., 2017; Leung et al., 2014; Lin, 2011).  
One of the goals of the issuance of debt securities (bonds) is to finance debts that are due (refinancing) (Hansen & 
Crutchley, 1990; Harford et al., 2015). Issuance of corporate bonds proxied as funding bonds with long term debt 
(BLTD), where LTD is a long-term debt (more than 1 year) (Benzion et al., 2017). Used the LTD because long-term 
debt is considered a more stable source of funding, and is less likely to cause defaults in the short term (Jankowitsch et 
al., 2014). This finding confirms the hypothesis that increases in bonds to Long-term debt is least partly due to the 
issuance of new bonds, in addition to the long-term outstanding debt. The preference decision for refinancing fixed 
coupon debt will be considered at interest expense. Variations of this trade-off revealed that companies require savings 
interest rates for refinancing. A dynamic model of debt refinancing that reveals agency costs. The existence of high yield 
restrictions increases the value of the company.  
Dependent variable  
The bank's performance related to the process of fundraising and distribution of funds is assessed based on indicators of 
profitability. Firm performance is the result of the implementation of all the firm policies, which is measured in a certain 
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period (Djalilov & Piesse, 2016). Bank profitability is measured by using a return on assets (ROA), because as 
considered it can show bank efficiency in using the assets as the source of investment that can result on profit (Rahman 
et al., 2017; Sufian & Noor Mohamad Noor, 2012; Terraza, 2015; Yasser & Mamun, 2017). ROA has been used in most 
studies of bank performance. ROA is an accounting-based indicator of return on assets, calculated as the ratio of net 
income (before tax) to total assets.           
Model Analysis 
The analysis technique used in this research is Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) based on variance or Partial Least 
Squares (PLS), and thus, this technique is also called PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2013). PLS-SEM can work efficiently with 
small sample sizes and complex models. The selection is given to bootstrapping because this resampling method is 
stable when the original sampling is more than 100. In this paper, the PLS-SEM model is using WarpPLS60. The 
hypothesis, each H1 (a, b) and H2, tested by using the following model:  
ROA = β Y1X1 OC + β Y1X2 BIC + β Y1X3 BLTD + e2      
Besides testing the overall sample, this study distinguishes between state-owned banks and private banks to find out if 
there are differences in behavior. 
RESULTS / FINDINGS  
Descriptive Analysis  
Table 1 presents descriptive data of the research variable and these data include minimum rate, maximum rate, mean 
rate, and standard deviation. Descriptive statistical test results show that all variables have an average value higher than 
the standard deviation. It means the overall data has a small variation. The average percentage of the board of 
independent commissionaire is 56.1%, which is following the regulation of OJK that requires a minimum of 50% of the 
total of commissionaire members.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variable Observed 
Variable N Mean Max Min SD 
OC 192 0.717 0.990 0.568 0.145 
BIC 192 0.561 0.750 0.333 0.100 
BLTD 192 0.514 1.218 0.034 0.292 
ROA 192 0.021 0.052 -0.049 0.013 
Source: Output WarpPLS6.0 
After treating all data, this research will test the bank's performance based on the level of ownership. In this study, a 
bank performance test will be based on the level of ownership. A bank performance test will be based on the level of 
ownership. In this bank, both the deed of establishment and capital are owned by the government so that all activities are 
controlled by the government and all profits are owned by the government. The sample consisted of 4 state-owned 
commercial banks, 7 regional government-owned banks, and 13 private banks. 
Evaluation of Structural Model Using ROA-Based Firm Performance 
Table 2 Present the results of evaluating structural models using ROA-based company performance. The adjusted R-
squared ROA for all bank samples is the largest, 0.129. Followed by adjusted R-squared results for ROA at government 
banks 0.112 and adjusted R-squared for ROA at private banks 0.102. The coefficient of determination in linear 
regression is often defined as how much ability all independent variables in explaining the variance of the dependent 
variable. Ownership Concentration means the ability variable (OC), Independence Board of Commissioners (BIC), and 
Bond to Long Term Debt (BLTD) in explaining the variance of Bank Performance (ROA) amounted to 13% in the 
overall sample bank. This means there is an 87% variance Bank Performance variables (ROA) were explained by other 
factors. Adjusted R-squared for ROA of the three sample groups is in the weak category because the variance explained 
by the independent variable is less than 0.250. The Q-squared value for ROA is the three sample groups more than null 
so it can be said that the model has predictive validity. All variable relationships have effect sizes above 0.02, which fall 
into the small category.  
Test results on the Goodness of Fit (GoF) output indicate that the ROA-based model has very good suitability. Shown by 
the P-Value for the Average Path coefficient (APC), Mean Square (ARS) and Adjustable-Square (AARS) at a 
significance level <0.05. Both of the value of Average Block VIF (AVIF) and Average Full Co linearity VIF (AFVIF) is 
< 3.3, it can be indicated that no multi co-linearity problems were found among exogenous variables. Three groups of 
samples have a matching value > 0.36 which means that the suitability of the model is included in the large category. 
Observed indices, such as Symson's Paradox (SPR), R-Squared Contribution Ratio (RSCR), and Non-Linear Bivariate 
Causality Direction Ratio (NLBCDR), all of these values are above 0.70, which can be considered as no causality 
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problem in the model. Also, the Suppression Statistics Index (SSR) has a value > 0.70, which can be said that this ROA 
based model is acceptable. 
The test results of the direct effect of Concentrated Ownership (OC) on Bank Performance (ROA) in the sample of all 
banks and the sample of private banks are significant negative. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 1a. The 
results of OC's direct influence on ROA on a sample of government banks are significantly positive. This result is the 
opposite of the previous sample, meaning not support hypothesis 1a. The result of the direct effect of the Independence 
Board of Commissioners (BIC) of the Bank Performance (ROA) in the third sample group was significantly positive. 
Test results in this study are in line with hypothesis 1b. 
The test results of the direct effect of Bond to Long Term Debt (BLTD) on the bank performance (ROA) in the three 
sample groups are significantly negative. The test results do not support hypothesis 2, which states that the issuance of 
bonds to meet long-term debt obligations positive effect on the bank's performance. 
Table 2: Result of Structural Model Evaluation Using ROA-Based Bank Performance 
Description Path Path Coefficient Adj. R
2 
Q
2 
Effect Size Standard Error 
All data samples 
OC→ROA -0.157** 0.129 0.164 0.075 0.038 
BIC→ ROA 0.151**   0.075 0.022 
BLTD→ROA -0.277***   0.075 0.094 
APC/ARS/AARS                 : 0.195 *** / 0.154 ** / 0.129** 
AVIF/AFVIF/ Goodness of Fit (GoF) : 1.109/ 1.159/ 0.393 
SPR/RSCR/SSR/NLBCDR         : 1.000 /1.000 / 1.000 / 0.833 
State-owned bank 
OC→ROA 0.177** 0.112 0.207 0.080 0.032 
BIC→ ROA 0.210***   0.080 0.055 
BLTD→ROA -0.199***   0.080 0.055 
APC/ARS/AARS                 : 0.195 *** / 0.142 ** / 0.112** 
AVIF/AFVIF/ Goodness of Fit (GoF) : 1.081/ 1.053/ 0.377 
SPR/RSCR/SSR/NLBCDR         : 1.000 /1.000 / 1.000 / 0.833 
Private bank 
OC→ROA -0.234*** 0.102 0.174 0.075 0.066 
BIC→ ROA 0.223***   0.075 0.060 
BLTD→ROA -0.066*   0.075 0.005 
APC/ARS/AARS                 : 0.174 *** / 0.131 ** / 0.105** 
AVIF/AFVIF/ Goodness of Fit (GoF) : 1.032/ 1.091/0.362 
SPR/RSCR/SSR/NLBCDR         : 1.000 /1.000 /1.000 /0.667 
***, **, * denotes significance levels at 0.001, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.  
All estimates influence between variables with a robust standard error. 
Source: Output WarpPLS6.0 
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS  
The hypothesis statement relevant to this ROA-based model is whether Concentrated Ownership, Independent Board of 
Commissioners and Funding with bond issuance have a direct effect on ROA. The analysis shows that Concentrated 
Ownership has a significant negative effect on ROA, and this result supports Hypothesis 1a. These findings are in line 
with the Entrenchment Theory by La Porta et al. (1999); and Shleifer and Vishny (1989). When the concentrated 
shareholders in a lot of power to use company resources to advance their interests more than the company. In the 
concentrated ownership structure, the agency conflict is a conflict between shareholders who have control of the 
company and the minority shareholders through a pyramid structure. These shareholders ideally function as management 
monitors, but in reality, top management is usually part of the family, which at the same time they have the power to 
take over minority shareholders.  
Contradictory results were found to occur in a sample of state banks which showed that Concentrated Ownership had 
0.177 a significant positive effect on ROA, so it did not support the hypothesis. These results support the research of 
(Chauhan et al., 2016; Gaur et al., 2015; Ozili & Uadiale, 2017; Shaban & James, 2017). A non-linear test was 
performed on the results of the rejected hypothesis. Inverted U curve is found, which means the percentage of the 
concentration of ownership level affects the increase in bank performance to the condition where the concentration of 
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ownership (OC) reaches 83.5%. When the concentration of ownership (OC) exceeds 83.5%, the bank's performance 
(ROA) experiences a reversal to negative. The results of this study are supported by the study of Altaf and Shah (2018) 
who found that when the main owner has effective control over the company, the effect on firm performance is inverted 
U-shaped (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Effect of Ownership Concentration toward Return on Assets.
Source: Output WarpPLS6.0 
The analysis shows that the independent board of commissioners has a significant positive effect on ROA, and this result 
supports Hypothesis 1b. The independent board of commissioners shows the importance of an internal set of 
independent board members of corporate governance in the financial decision. The higher proportion of independent 
board members in banks can reduce conflicts of interest and reduce inefficiencies stemming from CEO duality. The 
positive impact of the independent board of commissioners on greater efficiency and positively related to the efficiency 
of operating costs on bank revenue, that's means increasing bank profitability. Operating income positively influences 
net profit, thereby increasing profitability. The role of external supervision is found to be strong evidence of increasing 
profitability (Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 2018). 
The test results of Bond funding to Long Term Debt (BLTD) on the bank performance (ROA) in the three sample groups 
are significantly negative. The test results do not support hypothesis 2, which states that the issuance of bonds to meet 
long-term debt obligations positive effect on the bank's performance. Figure 2 presents the U-shape curve is found, 
which means the effect of Bond to Long Term Debt level affects the decrease in bank performance to the condition 
where the Bond to Long Term Debt (BLTD) reaches 72%. When the Bond to Long Term Debt (BLTD) exceeds 72%, 
the bank's performance (ROA) experiences a reversal to positive. Average data Bond funding to Long Term Debt toward 
Return on Asset on the entire sample is 56% smaller than 72%, so there is the position of the curve is on the decline. 
 
Figure 2: Effect of Bond to Long Term Debt toward Return on Assets
Source: Output WarpPLS6.0 
The behaviour of bank financing in Indonesia tends to use other sources of funding from third party funds (DPK) in 
advance. The amount of debt issued by companies should follow the optimal scale, which can improve the performance 
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of the company. Alternative bank financing through bonds is implemented so that the contribution of banks to the real 
sector or corporation can be channelled when the contribution of financing through credit is stalled. Bank experienced a 
trade-off between concentrating funds on a third party (DPK) or to corporate bonds than channelling funds through 
loans. 
CONCLUSION 
The effect of ownership is concentrated as a proxy of the external oversight mechanism on bank performance showing 
different results. It means that the implementation of concentrated ownership in banks with different types of ownership 
will result in different bank performance. The independent board of commissioners as a proxy of the internal supervision 
mechanism is proven to have a significant positive effect on bank performance. 
The capital structure is determined by the trade-off between the benefits of debt and the cost of debt (Fama & French, 
1998). This statement supports the results of this study. The results found a U-shape curve in the relationship of the 
effect of bond issuance funding on bank performance. The bank will consider operational funding based on the risk of 
bankruptcy and supervision costs. Banks that are at risk will reduce funding through debt, whereas safe banks are usually 
more flexible in issuing debt securities. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD  
Based on the conclusions above, it can be suggested for future research that is testing more deeply by using non-linear 
tests of each variable. Besides, try to use other internal and external monitoring variables and other leverage variables to 
determine the behavior of banking governance mechanisms in Indonesia.  
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